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Foreword
This Working Paper is a combination of two separate presentations given by each of
the authors and presented as a seminar in June 1999 entitled ‘Reforming the
Aboriginal Land Rights Act’s financial framework into a workable model in the
aftermath of the Reeves Review’. On reflection, the authors decided that the title of
the seminar was ambiguous and implied that the Act’s financial framework was not
workable, which is clearly not the case. The legislation has, of course, been working
even if sub-optimally, for 20 years. Hence the revised title of this Working Paper:
‘Reforming the Northern Territory Land Rights Act’s financial framework into a more
logical and more workable model’.
The research for this Working Paper followed the release of the report of the
Review into the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA) by John
Reeves QC entitled Building on Land Rights for the Next Generation. The seminar
presentation coincided with the release of Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy
Research (CAEPR) Research Monograph No. 14 Land Rights at Risk? Evaluations of
the Reeves Report. Research also coincided with the House of Representatives
Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs’ Inquiry into the
Reeves Report. However, while this Working Paper makes similar recommendations
to that of the findings of the Inquiry in rejecting Reeves’ reform of the ALRA, our
discussion is independent of the Inquiry’s Report.
This Working Paper is one of many contributions from CAEPR to issues arising
from the review of the Land Rights legislation. As amendments to the legislation are
in the process of being drafted, CAEPR will maintain its core research interest in this
policy area and further contributions will be forthcoming. This Working Paper is also
released concurrently with a CAEPR Discussion Paper No. 191 entitled ‘The
allocation and management of royalties under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act: options for reform’, by Jon Altman and Robert Levitus. While both the
Discussion Paper and Working Paper have similarities and articulate a range of
options to be considered for reform of the legislation, the latter focuses more on a
detailed analysis of the historical policy developments and reviews of the legislation,
provides some alternative options for reform, and explores a variety of different
issues relevant to the financial framework of the Act and royalty distribution.
Professor Jon Altman
Director, CAEPR
November 1999
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Introduction
The financial framework of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
(ALRA) has never been based on sound economic principles or even logical
accounting, let alone clear and transparent policy messages or even obvious
directives to Indigenous interests in the Northern Territory. With the benefit of
hindsight it is clear that Justice Woodward tried hard to accommodate pre-land
rights vested interests in his Royal Commission recommendations that were largely
incorporated into the legislation enacted in 1976 and which became law on Australia
Day, 1977. Nevertheless, it is also apparent that Woodward did not intend that the
financial framework remain unaltered, by and large, for 25 years after conclusion of
his Commission in 1974 (Woodward 1974).
The recent recommendations of the Review of the ALRA by John Reeves
propose radical reforms to the financial framework of the legislation. Rather than
restructuring or reformulating the prescribed statutory allocations of the current
financial framework, Reeves recommended that it be replaced by discretionary
allocations determined by a new statutory authority—the Northern Territory
Aboriginal Council (NTAC). The Review’s recommendations have been criticised
widely for many reasons. Much of this criticism has been focused on the radical
reform of institutions, the methodological approach of the Review, and a lack of
understanding of key concepts and constructs within the legislative framework (for
example, the concept of traditional ownership). Most notable amongst the criticisms
is that directed at the Reeves notion that the Land Rights Act should be the primary
framework to facilitate Indigenous socioeconomic advancement in the Northern
Territory (see, for example, Altman, Morphy and Rowse 1999).
Our discussion here is not a detailed critique of the Reeves Review; rather that
Review is placed in the sequential history of a series of reviews over the last two
decades. The major focus of this Working Paper is to re-examine the logic and
historical policy legacies associated with the financial streams of monies paid under
the Land Rights Act. This is an issue that is neither rarely explored nor evidently
understood by past and current reviewers. We intend to proceed firstly by re-
assessing the history, issues of principle and logic in the construction of the ALRA’s
financial framework and the inherent long-term problems and inconsistencies in
that framework. In addressing these problems and inconsistencies, we raise three
very straightforward but crucial questions informed to a great extent by earlier
research undertaken on the ALRA’s financial framework by reviewers, academics,
government agencies and consultants.
· Should royalties be paid to people in areas affected, and if so, how much should
be paid, to whom and for what purposes?
· How much should land councils receive, for what statutory functions and from
where (royalties or consolidated revenue or both)?
· Should royalties be paid to Northern Territory Aboriginal people as grants, and
why?
In conclusion, and for discussion purposes, we will raise some options for
change to the ALRA’s financial framework and ask how a more logical and more
workable model can be negotiated and devised given competing interests and
pressures for reform.
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History, logic and intention
Two important and complementary innovations were introduced by the then Minister
for the Interior, Paul Hasluck, in 1952 that still have ramifications in the current
ALRA financial framework. The first was the proposal that statutory royalties
extracted from mineral production on Aboriginal reserves should be earmarked for
the collective benefit of Aborigines residing in the Northern Territory. The idea was
that Aborigines could benefit from any wealth produced on reserved land (and hence
make this land work for their betterment) and that they would be compensated for
loss of land that may have been utilised by them for subsistence (hunting and
gathering) activities.
The second proposal was for the establishment of a trust fund into which all
royalties would be paid. There was an ulterior political motive behind these
proposals. Moy, the Director of Native Welfare, noted in a memorandum to the
Northern Territory Administrator that it was important that royalties raised from
mining on Aboriginal reserves were not paid to Consolidated (Commonwealth)
Revenue, but were seen to be earmarked for the use of Aborigines. It was implied
that any royalties that would be paid into the trust fund would not be offset by
concomitant reductions in spending from Consolidated Revenue. These payments
were intended to be supplementary to normal budget expenditure on Aboriginal
welfare and to act as a defence against any potential public criticism of mining on
Aboriginal reserves (Altman 1983: 5–6).
The Hasluckian vision and model of 1952 was the genesis of well-intentioned
and progressive, but illogical policy. While the idea of a double royalty levied on
Aboriginal reserves was apparently benign, it lacked logic because the dollars were to
be provided to Northern Territory Aborigines generally, not necessarily those on
affected reserves. The notion of direct compensation was not considered until 1963
when a House of Representatives Select Committee responded to the original bark
petition. Policy remained well intentioned and became somewhat more logical when,
in 1971, the government decided that areas or regions affected would be guaranteed
10 per cent of royalties raised on ‘their’ land. The reason for this change was largely
because after the Yirrkala Aborigines lost the Gove case, to add insult to injury, the
Aborigines were not guaranteed any return from mining on their reserves under the
earlier Hasluck model, unlike at nearby Groote Eylandt where the Church Mission
Society (CMS) had negotiated an extra royalty for local Aboriginal people when
negotiating with the mining company BHP.
The model proposed by Woodward in his Royal Commission findings accepted
and accommodated these historical precedents, but also addressed some highly
contested and interrelated issues in Aboriginal public policy at the time (Altman
1999: 109). Woodward recognised and openly debated the fundamental fiscal
tensions that emanated from his desire to accommodate historical precedent (the
Hasluck legacy), while also recognising Aboriginal property rights in land. Although
Woodward’s letters patent empowered him to consider the provision of full property
rights in minerals to Aboriginal land owners (rights not available to other
Australians), he stopped short of such reforms, instead recommending a weaker
form of property right in consent provisions (or what is frequently called ‘the right of
veto’) (Altman 1999: 110). Woodward recommended that all royalty payments be paid
over by the government to the regional land council (RLC) for distribution as follows:
· four-tenths to be retained by the land councils;
· three-tenths to be paid to the local community; and
· three-tenths to be paid to the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Fund (ABTF) for grants
(Woodward 1974: 114).
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These proportional allocations were arrived at arbitrarily. As Woodward (1974:
113) commented ‘in the final analysis an arbitrary decision has to be made and
tested in practice to see how it works’. He stated that this matter must be reviewed
by the government on request from the land councils from time to time, in the light
of the amounts of money involved and the respective needs of land councils, local
communities and other communities (Woodward 1974: 113). Woodward
substantiated his allocations and rationale as follows.
· He recognised the importance of arm’s length funding to land councils from the
Commonwealth Government and saw great merit in the land councils having a
substantial source of income not dependent on government approval (Woodward
1974: 114).
· In respect to local communities affected by mining, Woodward recommended
that any payments should go to the relevant community or communities which
would be affected by the exploration activities, and not to individual landowners.
He stated that provided the monies were to be spent on community purposes
they would appear in their true light as a compensation for disturbance and not
as an inducement (Woodward 1974: 111). Nevertheless, the consent provisions in
the Act provide a form of property right which can be traded for a negotiated
royalty (Altman 1999: 3) and are therefore the counterbalance to the right of veto
(Altman and Peterson 1984: 17).
· Woodward accepted the historical precedent that benefits should flow to all
Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. Woodward’s rationale was that
mining monies could lead to significant income differentials between traditional
owners and other Aboriginal people unless they were distributed in broad
equitable amounts and applied to community purposes. Therefore Woodward
recommended the retention of the ABTF specifically as the provider of grants and
loans for Aboriginal enterprises and community purposes (Woodward 1974: 113).
Woodward’s model has become known as the 40/30/30 formula, however this
model and the distributive mechanisms he articulated were never fully adopted in
the Land Rights Act. Instead, the Act created the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account
(ABTA), which replaced the ABTF, and all statutory royalties were to be paid to it for
distribution. The ABTA took on a clearinghouse function in respect to 70 per cent of
the royalties (40 per cent to land councils and 30 per cent to areas affected via the
land councils). The ABTA, rather than the land councils, adopted the role of
providing grants. While ss.64(1) of the Act stipulated that 40 per cent of royalties be
paid to land councils to finance their ministerially-approved budgets, and ss.64(3)
stated that 30 per cent of mining royalty equivalents (MREs) receipts of the ABTA be
paid to land councils for distribution to incorporated bodies in the areas affected by
mining, the Act did not guarantee that all of the remaining 30 per cent of the ABTA
receipts would be distributed Territory wide. Instead, ss.64(4) provided discretionary
powers to the Minister to make grants within the constraints of the remaining 30 per
cent. Furthermore, the inclusion of ss.64(5) in the ALRA provided that monies
originally intended specifically by Woodward for grants could also be used to meet
the administrative expenses of administering the ABTA.1
Woodward’s 1974 recommendations and the eventual enacted legislation, both
of which were framed with good intentions, presented three elements of poor logic
that still constitute the ALRA’s financial framework as outlined below.
1. Good intentions, poor logic, too much history
Woodward and the ALRA increased royalty payments to areas affected from the
pre-land rights days from 10 per cent to 30 per cent, while also allowing negotiation
of additional payments. This addition is due to the newly recognised rights of
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traditional owners and the existence of the right of consent or right of veto
provisions in the legislation.2 But there are a number of inconsistencies and
problems here.
· Traditional ownership is recognised but the legislation is careful not to earmark
statutory royalties to traditional owners only, but also to other residents.
· The legislation does not define the actual areas affected.
· The legislation gives no guidance as to how monies should be spent.
· The legislation does not specify why monies are paid. If payments are
compensation then they should be directed at the region, but should not be
linked to royalties. If intended as mineral rent sharing then they should be
directed at landowners, and if intended as both, they should be clearly
differentiated.
2. Good intentions, innovation and poor logic
Another 40 per cent was earmarked to fund the operations of land councils,
the Aboriginal statutory authorities established to claim land and to represent
traditional owners’ interests in land. The reason for funding land councils from
royalties was to ensure their independence from annual budgetary processes,
although their budgets have always required ministerial approval. Funding land
councils from royalties also gave the impression that they were relatively cheap,
being funded from revenue foregone rather than being an extra impost. But this
mechanism too is problematic:
· from the outset, 40 per cent was an underestimate of costs given the statutory
functions of the land councils;
· royalties fluctuate;
· bureaucracies are ‘sticky downwards’ in size and expense;
· this 40 per cent was inexplicably taxed at source at 6.4 per cent (hence being
37.4 per cent), an innovation introduced in 1979 by the then Treasurer, John
Howard;3 and
· whenever the 40 per cent was exceeded, land councils ran the risk of conflict
with their constituents who felt that land councils were spending too much of
the royalties cake.
3. Good intentions, too much history, poor logic
Another historic vestige was the decision to continue to provide a share of
royalties for the benefit of Northern Territory Aborigines generally so that non-land
owners would not fall too far behind the rest; or so that those with land but no mine
(which suggests royalties are economic rent), would not be second-class land
owners. This was meant to be 30 per cent, down from the Hasluckian 100 per cent
and the early 1970s 90 per cent. Unfortunately, the logic of this is most unclear:
· benefit was undefined, but was dependent on recommendations to the Minister
from an Aboriginal Advisory Committee;
· beneficiaries were undefined, but traditional owners of land and even recipients
of areas affected monies were not, and have not been, excluded; and
· a financial policy stipulating expenditure or investment was unstipulated leaving
the ABTA open to criticism for doing either or both, either too badly or too well.
The lack of overall logic in the framework is highlighted by the fiction of what
is often still referred to as the 40/30/30 formula. This formula has never operated,
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in any one financial year since it was initiated in 1978–79 as is demonstrated in
Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 1. Aboriginals Benefit Reserve (ABR) (former ABTA) disbursements
($), 1978/79 to 1997/98
Land council
administration
costs
Areas
affected
distributions
Grants
Northern
Territory wide
ABR
Administ-
ration
Total
Year Incl. ss.64(1) and
ss.64(7)
ss.64(3) ss.64(4) ss.64(5)
1978/79 454,328 340,747 2,481,695 4,091 3,280,861
1979/80 1,394,152 625,222 1,094,590 2,810 3,116,774
1980/81 1,992,794 1,229,386 500,713 9,729 3,732,622
1981/82 3,803,183 1,735,523 871,277 12,164 6,422,147
1982/83 7,366,178 5,283,457 659,582 18,204 13,327,421
1983/84 7,119,186 5,119,200 2,000,178 43,906 14,282,470
1984/85 8,583,395 5,209,283 4,888,055 56,009 18,736,742
1985/86 8,746,782 6,686,417 3,474,727 18,064 18,925,990
1986/87 8,746,032 5,970,979 1,083,036 83,078 15,883,125
1987/88 11,983,183 5,642,376 4,108,745 154,888 21,889,192
1988/89 12,195,674 5,648,591 8,076,203 239,691 26,160,159
1989/90 14,940,811 8,434,487 2,516,657 194,371 26,086,326
1990/91 14,286,621 10,714,965 8,330,927 215,978 33,548,491
1991/92 17,792,808 11,363,441 7,770,955 317,141 37,244,345
1992/93 16,217,445 5,576,896 9,561,396 98,495 31,454,232
1993/94 16,518,765 9,688,836 674,403 129,757 27,011,761
1994/95 17,166,096 8,610,973 651,181 174,819 26,603,069
1995/96 19,240,885 7,952,237 4,114,620 171,378 31,479,120
1996/97 13,187,901 10,400,286 3,895,506 98,699 27,582,392
1997/98 16,523,112 9,454,166 531,750 152,996 26,662,024
Total 218,259,331 125,687,468 67,286,196 2,196,268 413,429,263
Note: All outgoings include Mining Withholding Tax.
Source: Reeves 1998 for the period 1978/79 to 1996/97; ABR 1997–98.
As a net result of the implementation of the ALRA financial framework, the
following payments have been made for the period 1978/79 (when the ABTA
commenced operations) to 1997/98:
· $126 million (about 30 per cent of MREs) paid to areas affected (as distinct from
fully negotiated and potentially well defined compensation under agreement
provisions);
· $218 million (about 53 per cent of MREs) to fund land councils; and
· $67 million (about 16.5 per cent of MREs) in grants to, or for, the benefit of
Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory (also includes ABTA administration
costs) (Altman cited in Reeves 1997: 9).
The lack of logic in the financial framework of the ALRA has made Aboriginal
interests in the Northern Territory extremely vulnerable to criticisms on two broad
fronts. Firstly from non-Aboriginal political interests, wider public scrutiny and
independent review due to the absence of transparent policy logic and expenditure
guidelines, and possible negative representation of how resources are expended is
always possible. Hence:
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· land councils could be criticised for exceeding 40 per cent of royalties
irrespective of performance;
· associations in areas affected could be criticised for not ameliorating social
impact (if the logic is compensation) or for not delivering economic development
or socioeconomic improvement (if rent sharing was the logic, although if this was
the case, improvement should be targeted at traditional owners);
· the ABTA holding the residual could be criticised for spending too much, or not
investing enough, or investing badly, or for making grants (such as for vehicles
or for the purchase of pastoral stations) that accord too closely with Aboriginal
priorities; and
· in all areas, Aboriginal interests face a lose/lose situation, and in such situations
there is little incentive to perform.
Table 2. ABR proportion of outgoings, 1978/79 to 1997/98
Land council
administration costs
Per cent
Areas affected
distributions
Per cent
Grants
NT wide
Per cent
Year Includes ss.64(1) and
ss.64(7)
ss.64(3) ss.64(4)
1978/79 14.0 10.0 76.0
1979/80 45.0 20.0 35.0
1980/81 53.0 33.0 13.0
1981/82 59.0 27.0 14.0
1982/83 55.0 40.0 5.0
1983/84 50.0 36.0 14.0
1984/85 46.0 28.0 26.0
1985/86 46.0 35.0 18.0
1986/87 55.0 38.0 7.0
1987/88 55.0 26.0 19.0
1988/89 47.0 22.0 31.0
1989/90 57.0 32.0 10.0
1990/91 43.0 32.0 25.0
1991/92 48.0 31.0 21.0
1992/93 52.0 18.0 30.0
1993/94 61.0 36.0 2.0
1994/95 65.0 32.0 2.0
1995/96 61.0 25.0 13.0
1996/97 48.0 38.0 14.0
1997/98 62.0 35.0 2.0
Total 53.0 30.0 16.0
The second front of vulnerability is within the Aboriginal polity as there is
constant tension in the division of the royalty cake. The discretionary nature of
payments to Northern Territory Aborigines and land councils, especially after
supplementary funding options were introduced in 1979, put these two new
institutional forms in conflict despite the fact that land councils nominated ABTA
Advisory Committee members. At the bureaucratic level land councils were keen to
attract budgets adequate to fund their statutory functions, while the ABTA was
constantly bemoaning its lack of access to 30 per cent of the royalties. People in
areas affected, generally represented by traditional owners, bemoan the fact that 70
per cent of ‘their royalties’ are not directly available to them, or else complain that
their mine is less valuable than another (with a smaller impact) or that one royalty
regime is inferior to another.
WORKING PAPER NO. 5 7
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H
Any reviewer can exploit these criticisms from both within and outside the
Aboriginal domain and it was only a matter of time before a severe critique such as
that by John Reeves appeared. Reeves’ critique of the financial aspects of the ALRA
lacks any hard empirical evidence but nevertheless highlights the statute’s
shortcomings and vulnerability. Reeves suggests that over the past 20 years
Aboriginal socioeconomic status both on, and off, Aboriginal land has stagnated,
ipso facto because the ALRA’s financial framework is ineffective. In reference to the
tripartite division of the royalty cake, Reeves (1998) suggests that:
· land councils soak up too much of the royalty cake; not 40 per cent as intended,
but 50 per cent plus. Also the value of the land claimed, 250,000 sq kms, is
lower than the payments to land councils, therefore the claims process is not a
success, but a failure;
· areas affected monies, without statutory guidelines for expenditure, have not
solved the socioeconomic problems of regional populations and have at times
been paid in cash. Reeves emphasises that these distributions have caused
conflicts that, arguably, exceed the social impact of mining. Hence, such
payments should no longer be guaranteed notwithstanding the contribution and
application of these receipts in the regional economy; and
· the 17 per cent of royalties paid in grants to Northern Territory Aborigines may
have accorded with Aboriginal priorities, but they have not been paid under an
overarching charter of providing better health, housing and education—areas
which Reeves views as priorities.
Impacting events and past reviews
As already noted, Woodward’s (1974) model was never exactly implemented in the
legislation although, in the main, the central concepts such the payment of MREs to
the three types of entities, were adopted. The thrust of these central concepts
remains evident despite the impact of specific events and recommendations of past
reviewers. On the other hand, and over time, Woodward’s financial model has been
slowly eroded in certain areas and fragmented perhaps to the extent that it is
evident that its relevance may not be meaningful in the 21st century. Indeed, the
incremental change of the overall model began soon after the enactment of the
ALRA.
The passing of the Northern Territory Self-Government Act in 1978 changed
the financial landscape of the land rights regime. The Land Rights Act was amended
to provide that where the expression ‘Crown’ was used, it could include the Crown in
the right of the Northern Territory where relevant (Rowland 1980: 22–3). This
permitted the newly formed Northern Territory Government to levy royalties from
mining operations (except for uranium), yet the Commonwealth Government
continued to pay the MREs to the trust fund. Hence, as Toohey (1984: 112–13)
noted, the ‘conceptual’ nexus between statutory royalties and payments to the Trust
Account was broken when the Commonwealth gave the Northern Territory the right
to raise and retain certain mineral royalties but retained the responsibility to pay
equivalent amounts into that account (Toohey 1984: 112–13). In reality, however,
this nexus was never realised in the context of the ALRA as the first payments to the
ABTA were generated in the same year as self-government.
About this time it was also recognised that in some financial years land
councils might not be able to meet their administrative costs from the allocation of
40 per cent of MRE under ss.64(1). It was also found to be illegal to provide
additional funds to land councils under ss.64(4) (Altman 1983: 74). Therefore a
section was included in the Act allowing for the Minister to approve additional (often
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referred to as supplementary) payments to the land councils for administrative
purposes. This amendment allowed the Minister to direct supplementary MREs from
the residual 30 per cent held in the ABR, to land councils when the 40 per cent of
MREs did not meet the cost of their proposed administrative expenditure for a
particular year. The inclusion of this section (ss.64(7)) was another departure from
the 40/30/30 formula and further depreciated the opportunity to comply with
Woodward’s original intention that 30 per cent of MREs be spread Territory wide.
A significant event to occur in the early years of implementation of the Act was
the establishment of the Tiwi Land Council (TLC) in 1978. This was a further and
immediate departure from Woodward’s preferred two land council model. The
establishment of the TLC is significant from a number of perspectives. Firstly, it was
the first small land council and initiated prospective opportunities for similar
‘breakaway’ land councils. Secondly, and unlike the two large land councils, the
TLC’s jurisdiction was located entirely on land held by an Aboriginal Land Trust and
therefore it was not necessary to lodge land claims nor to articulate and manage a
strategic land claim program. Furthermore, the TLC jurisdiction has been almost
completely devoid of interest by mining companies and, unlike the two large land
councils, it has not been required to devote significant resources to administering
the mining provisions of the Act. As a consequence of a comparative lack of
administrative tasks to be performed under the legislation, the TLC has consistently
performed its administrative functions within its financial allocation under ss.64(1)
and subsequently has been able to provide grants to Tiwi Islanders from the surplus
pursuant to ss.35(1) of the Act.
Two reports on the operations of the Land Rights Act were commissioned by
the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs within the first four years of its operations.
Turnbull was commissioned by Minister Viner in June 1978 to report on the impact
of mining royalties on Aboriginal Communities in the Northern Territory. In the
main, the Turnbull recommendations reflect the optimism of royalty income growth
that flavoured much of the Act’s financial policy development up to the late 1980s.
Turnbull stated that royalty income from present and future mining operations
would provide a basis for phasing out all the present operations of the Department of
Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) (now the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
(ATSIC)) in the Northern Territory. The timing of this could depend upon the
development of new projects that produce royalties and rents for Northern Territory
Aboriginals. With receipt of uranium royalties, the phase-out could occur within the
next ten years. Turnbull recommended an immediate need to develop a strategy and
schedule for a phase-out program (Turnbull 1980: 45).
In 1979, B.W. Rowland QC (a Perth lawyer) was asked to examine
representations received by the Minister on the practical application of the Land
Rights Act for the period 1976 to 1980.4 One of Rowland’s major recommendations
was that land councils be funded from the Commonwealth’s Consolidated Revenue
Fund (CRF) through the budgetary process rather than through a linkage with
MREs. The main thrust of this recommendation was that land council funding
should be seen to be independent and not directly linked to royalty type payments.
Rowland’s perception was that the land councils could be seen to have a financial
interest in increasing the amount available to them and that could temper the
objectivity of land council advice to the traditional owner (Rowland 1980: 54).
Similarly, Altman (1983) advocated the use of direct and additional CRF flows to
land councils when the 40 per cent was insufficient for land council administrative
budgets. This suggestion was advocated in the context of ensuring the intent of the
original Woodward model.
The most extensive and all encompassing review of the entire Act prior to the
recent Reeves Review was undertaken by Justice Toohey. Toohey (1984: 109)
examined the arbitrary method of distributing monies from the ABTA but was
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unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion, noting that the issue was not an easy one
to resolve. In respect to land council funding, Toohey, like Rowland, acknowledged
problems in a system of funding based on mining royalties but also saw greater
dangers in being dependent on grants from consolidated revenue. Hence Toohey saw
no reason for any fundamental changes to land council funding from MREs.
Toohey did, however, note that one approach would be to amend the legislation
in respect to areas affected, and reduce the percentage from 30 per cent to 10 per
cent. He suggested that 50 per cent would then be available for distribution for the
benefit of Aboriginals living in the Northern Territory. In effect, this would have been
a regressive policy as there was already a 10 per cent allocation to areas affected by
mining under the pre-land rights regime (Altman and Pollack 1998: 9). Another
option would be to discard the notion of percentages and empower the Advisory
Committee to determine, from year to year, the distribution of monies paid out of the
ABTA (Toohey 1984:109). While Toohey favoured a reduction in the percentage
distribution under ss.64(3) to ensure a more equitable distribution to Aboriginal
people in the Northern Territory and to broaden the range of beneficiaries of MREs,
he was very conscious of the impact on those associations already receiving areas
affected monies. Some associations, such as the Gagudju Association, had already
established projects, including commercial enterprises, which anticipated receipt of
30 per cent of MREs for at least the life of the mine. Without MREs income these
associations would have been unlikely to survive.
Ultimately, Toohey suggested that the status quo be maintained but also
suggested that the formula be reviewed in about two years time. Interestingly, the
Review of the ABTA in the following year was not given a specific term of reference
regarding the formula. Nevertheless, because of its wider ambit of addressing issues
of ABTA distribution methods the Working Party canvassed the issue. The Working
Party endorsed Justice Toohey’s recommendation for a specific review of the formula
and put forward possible options. These included:
· The pooling of all monies raised under ss.64(3) from which incorporated bodies
could apply for funds for projects that diminish the impact of the disturbance of
mining, thereby explicitly recognising a role of areas affected monies.
· That all ss.64(3) monies be paid to a ‘new’ ABTA, in actual effect discounting the
regional compensatory nature of the payments. The existing royalty associations
would have the same access to grants as other Aboriginal groups (Altman 1985:
246).
The Working Party eventually adopted the position that the original Woodward
model should be strictly implemented. It took the view that the ABTA was intended
to be a clearinghouse. The Working Party recommended the repeal of ss.64(7) and
ss.64(5) and an amendment to ss.64(4) to guarantee that at least 30 per cent of
MREs be paid to a proposed Northern Territory Aborigines Trust Account) to ensure
it met the original intent of the grant function (Altman 1985: 248).5
There was something of a hiatus in respect to review and research of the Land
Rights Act after the Toohey and ABTA Reviews due predominantly to a concentration
of effort to implement amendments to the legislation based on the findings of the
Reviews. The most significant of these amendments were to the mining provisions of
the Act in 1987 where the new provisions set out clear rights and responsibilities of
the land councils and mining companies and introduced conjunctive agreements
whereby traditional owners either approved or ‘vetoed’ mining at the exploration
stage. However, in 1989 Minister Hand initiated an examination of the financial
situation and arrangements of the ABTA due to a number of political and
administrative factors including the increased expenditure of the ABTA. A Working
Party was established, with Mr Greg Crough as Chair, which reported in late 1989.6
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This Crough Working Party identified a number of problems with the
distribution of ABTA royalty equivalent income and noted that the real level of MRE
income to the ABTA had declined by more than 30 per cent since 1982–83. At the
same time the ABTA expenditure had increased significantly, particularly in respect
to the provision of grants and discretionary payments to the land councils under
ss.64(7). The Crough Working Party proposed that the two large land councils could
recover costs associated with land claims and exploration licence applications in
order to decrease the draw on discretionary funding. Furthermore, it was
recommended that a moratorium be imposed on the ABTA grant functions to permit
a re-assessment of the objectives and effectiveness of ABTA grants and also to assist
the ABTA to accumulate a capital base (Crough 1989: 2). Notably, the Report
recommended a specific review of the distributions under s.64 of the Act.
In the 1991 report of the Inquiry into Mining and Mineral Processing in
Australia, the Industry Commission (IC) made a number of recommendations in
respect to the proportional allocations under the Land Rights Act. While the
Commission acknowledged that the intention of the distribution of monies under the
ALRA was to spread the financial benefits from mining activity on Aboriginal land to
the entire Aboriginal population of the Northern Territory it also cited the existing
arrangements as clearly reducing the incentives for any one group to agree to
exploration or mining on their land (IC 1991: 70). The Commission recommended
that by increasing the share of MREs to traditional owners in areas affected from 30
to 70 per cent it would provide more appropriate incentives for traditional owners to
make the ‘best’ land use decisions from their own and the nation’s point of view (IC
1991: 71).
The Commission also recommended that land councils, as statutory bodies
with functions and responsibilities conferred under Commonwealth legislation,
should be funded from the Commonwealth Budget (IC 1991: 71). The Commission
took the matter even further, commenting that since the taxpayer would then be
paying for the administration of the land councils on top of the MREs, it considered
that the Northern Territory Government, which receives the mineral royalties and
gains most from mining, should shoulder some of the burden by funding a
proportion of the MREs. The split between the Commonwealth and the Northern
Territory Government’s shares, could be negotiated in the context of the Grants
Commission process (IC 1991: 71).
Two Reviews of the ABTA were undertaken by Walter and Turnbull a firm of
Canberra Chartered Accountants in 1993 and 1995. The first of these Reviews was
of the internal operations of the ABTA. The major focus of the second Review was on
the viability of funds to sustain the ABTA’s statutory obligations in the face of its
volatile funding source (commodities) and increasing financial demands from land
councils. In their first report Walter and Turnbull stated that:
The net assets of ABTA are under significant threat of complete diminution.
Major reforms in the framework under which the ABTA and Land Councils
operate are required. The lack of recognition by Land Councils and Advisory
Committee of the intrinsic relationship of net assets of ABTA and the Land
Councils assets and operations and the Advisory Committee’s grant funding
activities are key issues that need to be addressed in resolving the threat. The
ABTA Secretariat cannot effectively control and protect the assets of ABTA, until
Land Councils and the Advisory Committee recognise the above mentioned
relationships in conducting their activities, or appropriate revisions to legislation
are made to provide mechanisms of control (Walter and Turnbull 1993: 4).
Hence Walter and Turnbull recommended the need for the fund to accumulate
capital to buffer any further or future potential declines in the receipt of MREs. The
Walter and Turnbull (1993) analysis of the ABR suggested that a figure of $64
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million would be needed to ensure that the ABR became self-sufficient in providing
for grants and that grants should be fixed at $5 million per annum.
In response to the Crough Review and the findings of Walter and Turnbull,
ATSIC implemented the Financial Management Strategy (FMS) in order to reverse
the decline in the reserve. Implemented in the 1994/95 financial year the FMS was
essentially an expenditure policy rather than an investment strategy.7 It was
premised on ‘freezing’ land council administrative expenditure at 1993/94 levels,
thus reducing the expanding draw on ss.64(7) supplementary monies. The strategy
also limited expenditure of grants pursuant to ss.64(4) to $5 million per annum and
attempted to ensure that funds in the reserve would not drop below $23 million. The
large land councils argue that the FMS has restricted their ability to meet their
functional responsibilities and has severely hampered the implementation of their
regionalisation programs.
The origins of the most recent review of the ALRA can be found in the Federal
Government’s competition policy. However, Senator John Herron, Minister for
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs, ordered the Reeves Review in response
to calls primarily from the Northern Territory Government which have continually
argued that the Act is largely unworkable (ATSIC 1998: 1). Indeed, Reeves’ findings
allude to similar unworkability. According to Reeves (1998: 350) the 30/40/30
distribution and the number of bodies involved (that is, land councils, royalty
associations, ABR advisory Committee and ATSIC) has caused an unnecessary
fragmentation of the administration of the ABR monies between all these groups.
This fragmentation, Reeves suggests, is not conducive to the pursuit of a central
policy in the application of the ABR monies. In order to remedy this situation, Reeves
recommends that the Act be amended to clearly set out a policy objective for the
application of ABR monies (Reeves 1998: 350).
A key feature of the Reeves’ recommendations was the replacement of the
current land council structure with a new regime of 18 RLCs, overseen by a new
institution called NTAC. NTAC incorporates functions of the ABR and the social and
economic program activities of ATSIC and the Northern Territory Government
together with a number of other functions such as Native Title Representative Body
operations. RLCs would inherit the bulk of functions currently undertaken by the
current land councils together with responsibility for providing economic and social
advancement programs to communities within their jurisdiction. The current
proportional allocation is replaced by a discretionary regime undertaken by NTAC’s
appointed directors and determined annually. There is essentially no guarantee that
groups or associations in areas affected by mining would receive MRE income from
NTAC and the methodology for allocating the discretionary funds by the NTAC
directors is left largely unresolved.
If public policy in the ALRA’s financial framework is already based on illogical
principles, then the Reeves’ recommendations, if implemented, would make this even
less logical. In particular, Reeves does not seem to comprehend that:
· it is impossible to keep the veto but not provide traditional owners with any
guaranteed access to financial incentives. In such circumstances traditional
owners will inevitably exercise the veto (Altman 1999);
· it is impossible to run 18 smaller land councils with enhanced statutory
functions more cost effectively than the status quo (Pollack 1999); and
· it is not possible to destroy bedded down existing institutions and institutional
arrangements overnight, at least not without a very persuasive argument and
not without significant opposition. One lesson from history is that the funding
provided to land councils from royalties has made them powerful political
organisations.
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Rather than focus on the question of socioeconomic advancement, which is
arguably, the realm of other legislative mechanisms other than the ALRA, the Reeves
Review may have been more effective if it had attacked the lack of logic in the
existing framework as outlined earlier in this Working Paper. Nevertheless, Reeves’
Report did two very useful things with respect to the ALRA’s financial framework:
· it highlighted, like no previous reviewer, the vulnerability of Indigenous interests
to negative evaluation of the ALRA’s financial framework, especially in situations
where the Federal Government is open to radical, unilateral and unsympathetic
reform; and
· it showed that to improve the financial framework of the ALRA policy makers
need to move beyond incrementalism and apply a reformist approach to
establishing a new framework.
Considerations for a new financial framework
In respect to which ‘entity’ should receive either an enhanced or diminished
proportion of the allocation, the maintenance or increase of the proportional
allocation of MREs to areas affected is the easiest and arguably the more logical to
sustain for the following reasons:
· traditional owners within an area affected actually make the decision on mining
on their land;
· decisions on mining relate to traditional owner property rights and MREs are an
obvious incentive to support mining;
· Aboriginal communities located in these areas affected by mining are amongst
the most remote in Australia, not just geographically but economically, socially
and culturally. For some communities the receipt of MREs may be the only
development capital ever obtainable;
· there is evidence to prove that MREs have been expended in these remote
regional economies; and
· the ‘compensatory’ nature of the payments is best sustained if paid to those
people directly affected by mining operations.
A further issue is that any reduction to the current proportion to areas affected
might have drastic results for some royalty associations. If changes were to be made,
it is imperative that the existing financial obligations of royalty associations are
examined thoroughly. Notably, most royalty associations have a diverse source of
funds and would probably survive in one form or another relying on program
assistance from ATSIC and other government agencies. However, those which have
invested heavily, based on the assumption of continuing receipt of MREs, risk the
loss of their major assets if ‘area affected’ monies are abolished or even reduced.
Indeed this issue has the same relevance today. Organisations such as the Gagudju
Association in Kakadu National Park have invested heavily in the regional economy.
The recent financial problems confronted by Gagudju demonstrate the organisation’s
reliance on MREs to maintain its investments and its broader commitments to social
program objectives (Altman and Pollack 1998: 9–10). The real problems that need to
be addressed are not so much the proportional allocation to areas affected, although
the current low allocation might be seen as an impediment to mining (see IC 1991),
but in clearly determining the geographic limits of the actual area affected, the
beneficiaries of resource development projects and creating proper and enforceable
accountability mechanisms.
The funding of land councils, more specifically the funding of the two larger
land councils, has attracted the most pronounced attention and criticism in the last
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decade when compared to other entities that receive MREs. They have been subject
to a high level of public scrutiny in Senate Estimate Committees and their financial
operations have been under continual review in the annual estimates process. Any
criticism of the land councils has been echoed by the Northern Territory Government
due to the adversarial relationship that has evolved over the years. This criticism
has led to a culture of constant monitoring and is partially responsible for the
imposition of financial constraints.
On the other hand, the large land councils have continued to bid for additional
funds and have argued that the imposition of the FMS restricts the land councils
from fully performing their statutory responsibilities. But how relevant and
sustainable is the land council argument? It is instructive to examine costs
associated with two of the primary functional responsibilities of the land councils,
namely land claims and mining. According to estimates of the Northern Land
Council (NLC), each claim contested by governments costs on average around half a
million dollars8 (Fletcher 1998: 5). As there are currently about 100 land claims to
be completed this suggests that the financial resources required to complete the
process could be potentially be very high. In respect to mining, the NLC calculates
that it spends $1.8 million a year, or 19 per cent of its total budget on mining and
exploration, for which it recovers $250,000 a year in user charges (Manning 1999:
70). Manning (1999: 71) notes that the Central Land Council (CLC) calculates that
its current gross spending on mining and exploration amounts to $1.45 million a
year, which is 14 per cent of its operating costs. As there are no current mining
tenements on the Tiwi Islands, and historically there have been few exploration
applications in its area, the TLC spends little or nothing on mining. The
Anindilyakwa Land Council (ALC) estimates that perhaps half of its total expenditure
is mining-related (Manning 1999: 14).
So what proportion of ABR income should land councils receive? As already
noted, significant financial resources will be required to complete the land claim
process and the number of Exploration Licence Applications (ELAs) to be processed
by land councils will be ongoing with cycles of peaks and troughs in the quantities to
be processed. At the same time, the large land councils have considerable pressure
on them to regionalise which requires further financial resources, and land councils
also have a wide range of other statutory functions to perform than simply land
claims and ELA processing. It would not be difficult for the land councils to draw up
a list of resource requirements against their functions to demonstrate what needs to
be done and how. Just like most Aboriginal institutions and organisations the
resources are inadequate to comprehensively undertake all the tasks at hand.
Hence, there appears to be a strong case for enhanced funding to land councils
particularly if objectives are adopted to quickly finalise the land claims process,
expedite ELA processing, develop existing Aboriginal land and permit the large land
councils to embark on a program of full regionalisation.
A further dimension for consideration is the method of apportionment between
each of the four land councils. Under the current model, the Minister determines the
proportion of administrative funding to each land council based on populations as
demonstrated in Table 3. This results in allocations to the NLC of 22/40, CLC of
15/40, TLC of 2/40 and of ALC 1/40. However this apportionment occurs only for
the 40 per cent of MREs through ss.64(1). The actual apportionment of the quantum
of administrative monies is far greater because the large land councils receive
supplementary funding through ss.64(7). The apportionment of administrative
monies to land councils can therefore be seen as a mix of guaranteed funding based
on population together with a discretionary allocation based on administrative need
as determined by the Minister.
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Table 3. Estimated resident Aboriginal populations in each land council
jurisdiction and allocations to each land council, June 1997
Region Population Percentage of
Aboriginal
population
Administrative
fund
allocation
NLC 30,070 58.9 22/40
CLC 17,522 34.3 15/40
TLC 1,989 3.9 2/40
ALC 1,507 2.9 1/40
Total Population 51,088 100.00
Source: Strategic Planning and Policy Branch, ATSIC.
There is a potential dilemma if the proportion of guaranteed administrative
funding to the land councils was to increase and a population apportionment
retained. If the same population formula were applied under, for example, a regime
that directed 50 per cent of MREs to land councils, the allocations would be in the
order of: NLC 27/50; CLC 19/50; TLC 2.5/50; and ALC 1.5/50. The net effect would
be increases to administrative budgets for the two small land councils and possible
diminution of funding in real terms to the two large land councils as supplementary
funding may not necessarily be available. Furthermore, the two small land councils
currently operate within the restraints of the 40 per cent allocation and the TLC
annually distributes a high proportion of its budget as a surplus. Any further
increases to the smaller land councils may result in increasing this surplus. This
may not be a desirable result if an increase in land councils’ administrative
allocations are supported and premised on improving land council operational
outcomes.
To overcome such a deficiency, a model would need to be devised that directed
MREs for administrative purposes based on operational activity rather than
apportionment based purely on population. The current apportionment could be
replaced by a process of assessment of operations and workloads similar to that
recommended in the 1995 Review of Native Title Representative Bodies. Under such
a regime, and in the context of the ALRA, operational activity would be assessed
annually based on criteria such as land claims, ELAs and other functional
requirements to be completed in any one year (see Table 4 for ELAs). An essential
component would also be the extent of Aboriginal freehold land within each land
council jurisdiction, given the land administration functions and potential land
management role for land councils (see Table 5 for area of Aboriginal land in each
jurisdiction). However, such criteria would also make provision for the population
given the Acts emphasis on informed consent and the consideration of impacts on
traditional owners and Aboriginal residence.
The above commentary assumes the continuance of funding to land councils
based on MREs. As noted, a number of assessments of the Land Rights Act over the
years have recommended direct funding to land councils from the CRF. The IC
(1991: 71) suggested that land councils should be funded in the same way as other
Commonwealth Statutory Authorities. Rowland (1980: 54) saw a potential conflict of
interest for land councils because their income from royalty type payments is derived
from mining operations when their functions require the land council to give
objective advice to traditional owners as to whether mining should proceed.
However, as traditional owners have similar financial incentives, and the informed
consent provisions of the legislation provide satisfactory safeguards, a conflict of
interest does not generally arise. Other arguments to promote direct funding to land
councils from CRF address the uncertainty of the current funding system which is
ultimately based on fluctuations in commodity markets and mineral production.
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Table 4. ELAs and mines in each land council jurisdiction
Region ELAs Proportion
Per cent
Mines
NLC 204 36.4 2
CLC 351 62.6 2
TLC 1 0.2 0
ALC 5 0.3 1
Total 561 100.0 5
Source:Northern Territory Department of Mines and Energy, March 1999.
Table 5. Area of Aboriginal land in each land council jurisdiction
Region Area
(km2)
Percentage of
Aboriginal land
Percentage of
Northern Territory
NLC 166,358 29.3 12.3
CLC 391,643 68.9 29.1
TLC 7,768 1.4 0.6
ALC 2,500 0.4 0.2
Total Aboriginal land 568,269 100.00 42.2
Total Area 1,346,200
Source:Northern Territory Department of Land, Planning and Environment, August 1999.
Reeves (1998: 349) addressed the question of the uncertainty in relation to
ABR MRE receipts and argued for the retention of the current system regardless of
its shortfalls. He commented:
There are good reasons for maintaining the historical link between the ABR’s
income and mining royalties that flow from mining on Aboriginal land. This link
provides a unique and historical rationale for the payments. If this historical link
is broken and the income of the ABR is linked to some other factor, it may only
be a matter of time before the payments are discontinued because they do not
have such a unique and historical underlying rationale (Reeves 1998: 349).
While these unique and historical factors provide a rationale to continue the
payments, the current system of MREs payments provides the land councils with
some autonomy from government budgetary considerations, a process that is not
necessarily free from fluctuations in allocations to policy sectors. Overall, it would
appear that there are enough factors to support the current system.
A possible alternative model is to maintain a statutory distribution and adopt
the Reeves proposal to provide additional funding from the CRF to land councils
specifically for the purpose of land claims. Reeves notes that a precedent exists in
respect to similar funding arrangements to Native Title Representative Bodies. Such
additional funding to land councils, would have a ‘sunset’ clause, like the land claim
process itself but, nevertheless, would permit the land councils to diversify and
refocus their MRE resources to operational activities such as land development and
management rather than land acquisition. In addition, the repealing of the
requirement to levy mining withholding tax on ABR expenditure would provide
additional resources and permit an increase to the statutory guaranteed
administrative funding without distorting the increase in favour of the smaller land
councils.
As noted earlier, the notion of spreading the ‘benefits’ from mining Territory
wide, rather than applying them to specific areas, originated in the Hasluck era.
Although Justice Woodward substantially reduced the proportion from 90 per cent
to 30 per cent he maintained the grant functions of the ABTF because he observed
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that it worked well and had the confidence of Aboriginal people (Woodward 1974:
113). Indeed, the provisions of these grants are seen by Northern Territory
Aborigines as being just as important today. However, during the formulation of the
Hasluck and Woodward models, organisations such as the DAA and ATSIC did not
exist. The latter is a representative Aboriginal organisation with discretionary powers
to allocate monies to Aboriginal communities and reflects many similarities with the
role of the ABR Advisory Committee. Essentially, during the formulation of the
ALRA’s financial framework in the 1970s the government commitment to providing
mainstream and special programs to Aboriginal people on an equitable basis with
other Australians was not as evident as it is today. These are policy shifts that have
occurred in the last two decades. In fact, the operations of ATSIC may have
contributed to the continuing decline in the allocation of grants by the ABR.
While the proportion of the allocation to areas affected has remained static,
and those to the land councils, overall, have increased over time, the proportion
made available to grants to, or for, the benefit of Aboriginal people residing in the
Northern Territory has substantially decreased. Between the 1978/79 and the
1997/98 financial years, the proportion allocated to grants was 16 per cent as
opposed to the 30 per cent recommended by Woodward (1974). Under the FMS,
grants are currently capped at $5 million (roughly 12 per cent of current ABR
annual income) and have been for the last six or seven financial years. In more
recent individual financial years, and in terms of actual annual expenditure, the
proportion has dropped to as low as 2 per cent.9
A further complexity in terms of equity and balance arises in respect to the
comparative application of mining monies between the ALRA and the Native Title Act
1993. Payments to Native Title Holders (NTHs) under the Native Title Act are
explicitly compensation and are directed to NTHs or a prescribed body corporate
within a specific area. This is comparable to the negotiated royalties under the
ALRA. However, the statutory royalties prescribed in the Land Rights Act provide for
wider beneficiaries than those within the area affected. In effect a NTH can be a
beneficiary, by way of grant pursuant to ss.64(4) of the ALRA, from mining monies
derived some distance from their land and at the same time potentially become a
beneficiary of the native title compensation should mining take place on the NTH’s
land. There is no requirement for NTHs to distribute benefits Territory wide.
Notwithstanding these policy ambiguities, the abolition of grants from the ABR
appears to be a politically sensitive issue and one that would be opposed by
Northern Territory Aborigines. Indeed, this issue was raised in the recent House of
Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs
Inquiry with the Chairman of the Committee alluding to the necessity to maintain a
proportion of MREs to provide grants. However, the current allocation of $5 million
per annum could be met by existing policy mechanisms and outside a statutory
regime that specifies an exact allocation. As Walter and Turnbull (1993) noted, with
a base of $64 million the ABR would be able to facilitate its current level of grant
releases of $5 million, as specified in the FMS, from investment interest. Given that
the ABR’s current accumulated assets are nearing $50 million,10 the figure of $64
million could be achieved by setting a moratorium on the grant function for a period
of two to three years so as to permit the fund to grow from its current base to the
level recommended by Walter and Turnbull. The proviso, in this context, is that land
council funding is similarly constrained so as to achieve the financial goal of $64
million.
The arguments we have outlined suggest an increase of funding to both areas
affected and to land councils while ABR grants are seen as anachronistic. As a
framework for negotiation we suggest that there should be an increase to areas
affected in the range of 40 to 50 per cent which should be linked with enhanced
internal and external accountability and the prevention of individual payments from
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MREs (but with potential for compensation to traditional owners from separate
negotiated agreements). Enhanced accountability measures would include:
· that funds transferred from land councils to areas affected associations are
subject to mandatory monitoring by the land councils (which should, in turn,
have a statutory requirement to report publicly on royalty association
performance);
· the development of distribution mechanisms for monies and other profits based
on association rules and published widely to members;
· negotiation of agreements with land councils to periodically develop alternative
mechanisms for the receipt and distribution of all monies, and for the monitoring
of such mechanisms; and
· negotiation of service delivery agreements with ATSIC, the Northern Territory
Government and local governments, which clearly specify respective
responsibilities (including funding) for service delivery within a region (Altman
and Smith 1999: 18).
Land council funding could be enhanced to 50 per cent to 60 per cent and
apportioned on operational criteria rather than population level. With enhanced
funding, land councils would be able to focus on land management and development
and to further their regionalisation strategies. Funding should continue to be paid
out of the ABR from MREs receipts to maintain land council fiscal autonomy from
the Commonwealth budgetary process. However, if a prime objective of all parties is
the quick finalisation of outstanding land claims then additional funding to complete
the claims process could come directly from consolidated revenue.
Further examination is required of the ABR’s grant function in the context of
its relevance within this area of public policy. Such an examination should be
undertaken in the context of the responsibility of government in the provision of
services to Aboriginal communities so as to ascertain whether such grants are a
duplication or substitution of services. Furthermore, the relevance of these grants
needs to be considered within the context of broader developments in Indigenous
policy and the creation of Indigenous institutions in the last two decades.
Conclusion
This Working Paper has focused on the lack of logic within the ALRA’s financial
framework and has outlined the historical origins of the evolution of the framework.
It is evident that the logic of the payment of MREs is largely unresolved and past
assessments of the framework accept the historical rationale rather than test the
logic or the lack of it. Nevertheless, some broad trends can be observed from the
preceding analysis of past assessments of the framework and impacting events and
reviews.
· There has been an acceptance by all reviewers that the concept of paying MREs
to Aboriginal interests should continue (although some have argued that land
councils should be funded in the same manner as other Commonwealth
Statutory Authorities, notwithstanding the lack of logic within the current
framework).
· Optimism in royalty growth, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, has been
replaced by a relative decline in royalty income (in real terms) together with
significant growth in ABR expenditure in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These
developments have influenced policy development in their respective ‘eras’.
· Amendments to the legislation and the implementation of financial policy and
guidelines have continued to erode the original Woodward model.
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· Many recommendations for reform or the restitution of the Woodward (1974)
model have been set aside or overtaken by other events.
· Incremental change, rather than radical recasting, has been the mainstay of
public policy developments within the ALRA’s financial framework despite some
radical recommendations for reform. (See Appendix 1 Table A1 which summaries
in historical sequence, recommendations for change by past reviewers and
commentators and the distribution policies implemented).
The rationale of public policy in the domain of the ALRA is mostly a hybrid of
historical precedent, consideration of the interests of the Aboriginal people of the
Northern Territory, and accommodating industry and the Northern Territory
Government. Questions of logic have never been resolved. Indeed such questions are
by no means easy to answer and have bedeviled policy-makers and reviewers since
the enactment of the legislation in 1976. A standard response of many reviewers has
been that a further examination of the proportional allocative model of the land
rights regime be pursued in future years. To resolve these issues of logic requires
one to first address a series of other questions such as: whether the payment of
MREs is compensation or rent, or whether the payments are public or private
monies. The overdue resolution of such questions would provide a clearer framework
for the appropriate usage of the mining royalties derived from Aboriginal land and a
clearer framework to construct appropriate accountability mechanisms.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Summary of the allocative formula for MREs under the ALRA as
recommended by past reviewers or implemented in policy and legislation
Area affected
(Per cent)
Land councils
(Per cent)
Grants
(Per cent)
ABTF (pre-land rights) 10.0 90.0
(includes loans)
Woodward 30.0 40.0 30.0
ALRA 1976 Statute 30.0 40.0
(maximum)
up to 30.0
ALRA 1979 Amendment 30.0 >40.0 <30.0
Rowland 1980 CRFc
Altman 1983 30.0 40.0
+ CRFc
30.0
Toohey 1983 status quo
Altman 1984 (ABTA) 30.0 40.0 30.0
IC 1991 70.0 CRFc 30.0
Reeves 1998 Discretionary Fixed at $400,000
for each of 18
RLCsa. NTACb
partly funded from
CRFc, partly MRE
discretionary
Note: a. RLC = Regional Land Council.
b. NTAC = Northern Territory Aboriginal Council.
c. CRF = Consolidated Revenue Fund.
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Notes
1 Notably, there has been only a very minor draw by the Aboriginals Benefit Reserve for its
administrative expenses (at the most 0.5 per cent of its income over time) as government
has covered its salary and running expenses.
2 It should be noted that on Groote Eylandt the CMS had already negotiated an extra
royalty for surrender of mineral leases they acquired so as not a break with precedent,
the traditional owners of the 1970s were the CMS of the 1960s.
3 In 1979, Mining Witholding Tax was at the rate of 6.4 per cent. Over time the tax has
reduced to 4 per cent. Nevertheless, approximately $20 million has been levied against
ABR expenditure transactions in the 20 years of the operation of the tax. Notably,
almost all reviewers of the ALRA have recommended the tax be abolished.
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4 In effect this was a reasonably limited review but it addressed issues relating to
Aboriginal land, mining, consent and compensation agreements, land councils, access
to Aboriginal land and Northern Territory self-government.
5 A major recommendation of this Review was the re-casting of the ABTA as a separate
statutory authority. Essentially the Working Party’s recommendation was premised on
the recognition of the two distinct functions of the ABTA: namely, as a clearinghouse
and as a grant provider. The clearinghouse function was to be maintained under the
DAA umbrella and renamed the Northern Territory Aborigines Trust Account. The new
separate ABTA would solely address the grant function.
6 The agreed terms of reference were simply:
· to develop strategies to address the current arrangements of the ABTA to ensure the
effective functioning of Aboriginal organisations receiving funding from the ABTA
under the ALRA;
· to recommend ways to implement these strategies; and
· to report to the Minister on the above (Crough 1989: 5).
7 The FMS was implemented under the previous Labor Minister (Tickner) and has been
continued by the current Liberal Minister (Herron) with a review date in the year 2000.
8 As Fletcher (1998: 5) notes, land councils carry significant costs for land claims
including litigation. Anthropological reports cost around $500 per day (generally these
take between 15 and 20 days) followed by a series of costly stages. The preparation of a
case by administration, lawyers and anthropologists costs on average around $25,000,
followed by on-site proofings at an average of $55,000, on-site evidence at an estimate of
$100,000 (depending on location), legal costs at $35,000, staff costs at $25,000 and
evidence given at the site of the claim at around $35,000 (Fletcher 1998: 5).
9 For example, the 1997/98 financial year (see Table 2). However, it should be noted that
the Minister has actually approved a further $11 million of grants which were yet to be
processed by the ABR as at 30 June 1998. This amount comprised of $5 million from
the 1996/97 and 1997/98 financial years, and $1 million from 1995/96 (ABR 1998:
11).
10 The ABR’s accumulated surplus at the end of the 1997/98 reporting period was
$48,747,484 (ABR 1998: 6). It is anticipated that accumulated surpluses at the end of
1998/99 will be about the same.
